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Abstract
Learned societies commonly carry out selection processes to add new
fellows to an existing fellowship. Criteria vary across societies but are typically based on subjective judgements concerning the merit of individuals
who are nominated for fellowships. These subjective assessments may be
made by existing fellows as they vote in elections to determine the new
fellows or they may be decided by a selection committee of fellows and officers of the society who determine merit after reviewing nominations and
written assessments. Human judgement inevitably plays a central role in
these determinations and, notwithstanding its limitations, is usually regarded as being a necessary ingredient in making an overall assessment of
qualifications for fellowship. The present paper suggests a mechanism by
which these merit assessments may be complemented with a quantitative
rule that incorporates both subjective and objective elements. The goal
of ‘measuring merit’ may be elusive but quantitative assessment rules can
help to widen the eﬀective electorate (for instance, by including the decisions of editors, the judgements of independent referees, and received
opinion about research) and mitigate distortions that can arise from cluster eﬀects, invisible college coalition voting and inner sanctum bias. The
rule considered here is designed to assist the selection process by explicitly taking into account subjective assessments of individual candidates
for election as well as direct quantitative measures of quality obtained
from bibliometric data. The methodology has application to a wide arena
of quality assessment and professional ranking exercises.
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“Man must not be afraid of what seems impossible to do. History
has shown that human beings possess a wonderful gift of being able to
obey the saying of Aristotle: ‘Measure the Unmeasurable’ ”, Ragnar
Frisch (Examination report as a student at the University of Oslo,
cited in Louça, 2007.)
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Introduction

Hierarchical elements and status inequalities are pervasive in modern industrialized society. Social stratifications arise from multiple sources such as socioeconomic conditions, occupation or profession, earnings, and education. Affiliation with the military or religious orders aﬀects community status just as
industrial power, media exposure, and political influence enhance visibility in
society. By contrast, anthropologists argue that some hunter-gathering societies
are (or were) relatively free from social stratification. Those societies typically
comprised small acephalous (or headless) tribal foraging groups where tasks were
more uniformly distributed across a group and decision making was largely by
consensus and there were fewer societal distinctions (Gowdy, 2006).
When stratifications do exist in society, distinctions are usually clear enough
to identify groupings of individuals according to certain characteristics such as
income and influence. Quantitative measurement can be straightforward in some
categorizations but qualitative assessment is often needed in others. Categorical information helps in distinguishing groups like Fortune 500 companies and
celebrity billionaires, and in providing classifications such as senior or middle
management in industry; quantitative data provide fine grain information on a
myriad of detail concerning characteristics such as income, wealth, age, size of
family, years of education and so on.
Learned societies, which are the focus of the present work, also operate stratified social structures. These societal structures form a meritocracy in which
some members occupy elevated positions relative to others, at least for a time.
Virtually all learned societies have presidents as leaders, a governing body or
council that determines policy, and an executive committee or oﬃcer(s) as an
administrative arm — all with fixed terms. Many societies award fellowships usually for life - to members whose credentials distinguish them within the society. Some also oﬀer distinguished fellowships which honor lifetime contributions
to a discipline. Such fellowships oﬀer status and lead to a stratified structure of
membership within a society that becomes a distinguishing characteristic of its
meritocracy. Fellowship in a leading international society is generally considered
to be a singular honor. As a public endorsement of merit and accomplishment,
it can have a lasting eﬀect on a career and accordingly is highly prized.
The subject of the present paper is the selection process by which such fellowships are determined. Assessment of merit necessarily involves human judgement about the contributions of individual candidates. But information about
and opinions of those contributions may diﬀer considerably in a voting pop-
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ulation. Debate on the qualifications for fellowship are as ancient as learned
societies themselves. In an archival study on the foundation of the Econometric
Society, for example, Louça and Terlica (2011) provide extensive evidence of
diverging views among the founders of that Society about candidates for fellows
in the early 1930s. They report continuing divisive debates among the broader
fellowship in the 1950s about selection criteria for fellowship1 .
Distortions in voting may arise for many reasons. For instance, intellectual
founders and leaders may veto certain candidates2 ; and coalitions of voters can
form among visible (i.e. physically extant) and invisible (e.g. by subfield or intellectual descent) colleges of electors to secure election for preferred candidates.
How, in such a system, can the merit that underlies a meritocracy be fairly determined? What elements - quantitative and qualitative - might enter into the
selection process to substantiate election? If democratic voting is involved in the
selection, how might the human electorate (of voters) and individual motives be
complemented with a material electorate (of data) so as to promote informed
and fair election that mitigates potential distortions? How, in short, may weaknesses in the democratic voting system be attenuated in societal decisions on
merit?
Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) analyzed data from fellowship elections in
the Econometric Society over 1990 - 2000 to assess whether these elections were
“fair” in the sense that the votes cast accorded with candidate qualifications.
Objective measures of quality were based on (i) the average number of citations
to the candidate’s work over the two preceding years, (ii) a count of the candidate’s publications in Econometrica (the Econometric Society’s journal), and
(iii) an indicator of whether the candidate had ever been an Associate Editor
or Coeditor of Econometrica. Controlling for this measure of quality, logit and
probit regressions were used to assess the empirical significance of various other
determinants of the election outcomes. The results revealed that successful
election depended on many characteristics other than quality, including current
aﬃliation, field, and geographical location.
Finding a mechanism for promoting fairness across fields, institutions and
regions, collecting and distributing the relevant information that can assist in
1 The 1950s debate was prompted by correspondence of Oscar Morgenstern circulated in
1953 to all fellows of the Econometric Society stating that

“in my view the Fellows ought to be persons who have done some econometric
work in the strictest sense. That is to say, they must have been in one way or
another in actual contact with data they have explored and exploited, for which
purpose they may have even developed new methods”
This viewpoint was strongly supported by some fellows (among them Robert Geary, Charles
Roos, and PC Mahalanobis) and opposed by others (including Tjalling Koopmans and Jacob
Marschak). In the end, no changes to criteria or procedures for fellowships were made.
2 From archival research on correspondence among the Council of the Econometric Society
in the early 1930s, Louça (2007) reports that one candidate for a fellowship was opposed
on the grounds that “he would not know a partial derivative” (op.cit. p. 31), an injustice
as it turned out. Another candidate was repeatedly opposed as president of the society as
“not recommendable” (op.cit. p. 35) on grounds that he “uses many words to express his
meanings” (op.cit. p. 35). See Louça and Terlica (2011) for further examples and discussion.
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this process, and respecting subjective assessments of credentials across a population of electors is a serious challenge for any society. Societies in quantitative
disciplines like economics may well be expected to rise to this challenge, as
Frisch enjoined in the header to this article, and show leadership in creating
and testing such selection mechanisms.3
This paper seeks to oﬀer some material assistance toward that goal. It
provides a quantitative rule that combines human judgement and quantitative
data on credentials in a mechanism that brings this disparate information into
the election or selection process without removing the eﬀect of individual votes
on the outcome of a candidate’s election. The goal, in short, is to assist the
process of voting on merit by measuring merit - measuring the unmeasurable
- by widening the eﬀective electorate that enters the decision process with a
broad additional class of objective and subjective elements. These elements
involve a comprehensive (i.e., electorate wide) peer evaluation component that
is combined with bibliometric measures to determine an explicit merit threshold
(a vote percentage) that is needed for election. Peer review and individual votes
continue to play a key role but they are complemented with material evidence
on accomplishment.
The statistical use of bibliometric data in combination with comprehensive
peer assessment has many potential applications that extend beyond the immediate arena of fellowship elections. Research assessment exercises that are now
undertaken in some countries (such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand)
are one example. Journal rankings and impact factors of research are another.
Senior management teams of universities and journal publishers now make substantial use of such credentials in promoting their institutions and publications.
Researchers who are accustomed to peer review processes in journal and promotion decisions often find themselves uncomfortable with the mechanical approaches that are typically adopted in producing these rankings, especially when
they are obtained by automated harvesting of bibliometric data and search engine methods. The challenge we face in such assessment exercises is to utilize
the vast and growing quantity of bibliometric data in a manner that complements established peer evaluation processes which most professionals view as a
necessary component in quality assessment. The methodology explored in the
present paper provides a mechanism to address that challenge and strengthen
the data-based foundation of the quality assessment process.

2

Merit Threshold and Credentials

In societies where fellowship elections are held, candidates need to achieve a
certain threshold percentage (τ ) of positive votes from the electorate of voters
to be successful. This voting electorate might be the collection of all existing
3 Some journals in economics already use automated measures in determining fellowships
(Journal of Econometrics ), distinguished authorships (Journal of Applied Econometrics ) and
annual prizes (Econometric Theory ). The measures employed in these awards rely on bibliometric counts and are not complemented with peer review data.
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fellows in the society, a fellowship selection committee or even the governing
body or council. Some examples from leading learned societies in economics,
statistics and national academies are given in the Appendix. The threshold may
be arbitrary, such as some number in a certain interval like τ ∈ (0.25, 0.75) , and
it might be set by the governing body of the society or the selection committee
chair.
Thresholds are often decisive in elections. If many strong candidates fall
short of attaining the required percentage of favorable votes, a societal governing body may adjust the threshold downwards to increase the number of
successful candidates in subsequent elections. If the threshold is considered too
lenient, then it may correspondingly be increased. In this sense the threshold
is endogenous. Its value may be reactive both to past election results and to
governing body opinion regarding exclusivity. In eﬀect, the number τ is a voting
merit threshold for fellowship which relies directly on inner sanctum views of
exclusivity and indirectly on views of past election results. Typically, τ is a
common value that applies across all candidates.
The mechanism suggested in the present paper seeks to bring further information to bear on this critical merit threshold, to provide a flexible data-based
method for the determination of τ , and to make τ individual specific. The
mechanism can be used to complement existing systems of election by simply
importing information into τ , thereby making the endogeneity of τ explicit and
specific to an individual candidate, without removing the power of the human
electorate of voters to elect.
The credentials that define merit are subjective and inevitably rely on personal judgement. But they also rely on knowledge (if only by hearsay or on
information transmitted in nominating statements and referee reports on candidates) of material accomplishments and personal assessments of the importance and relevance of those contributions. We therefore propose that the merit
threshold be determined to explicitly incorporate such information — both objective and judgemental — and to do so in a way that reflects a wide body of base
knowledge in the profession arising from published research and its adjudged
merit. Importing quantitative and qualitative information in this way widens
the eﬀective electorate beyond the immediate voters: for example, published
research reflects decisions taken by editors and the judgements of independent
referees on the worth of a candidate’s research; and citations or online downloads reflect received interest about the research amongst a broad readership of
fellow researchers. The goal, in eﬀect, is a mechanism that assists in measuring
the ‘unmeasurable’ element of merit in a meritocracy.

3

A Fellowship Election Formula

In what follows, we lay out an evidence and peer review based approach to
determine τ . As indicated, we seek to make τ individual specific so that its value
may reflect the merits of an individual candidate as measured by the information
set that is used in its determination. The distribution of τ across the candidates
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depends on the distribution of the inputs of objective and subjective information
about those candidates for election. The resulting distribution diﬀerentiates
candidates according to their revealed merit but it leaves to voters the ultimate
task of determining election.
The specific formula given below is parameterized and the particular choice
of parameters will influence outcomes. The formula may be trialed on past
election data to find parametric values that correspond closely to actual election outcomes and those that produce alternative results with greater or lesser
numbers of successful candidates. For certain explicit distributions of objective
and subjective evidence, we will report some exact distributional results that
show the response distribution of τ to its inputs. These distributions reveal the
flexibility of the approach and the way diﬀerent types and levels of credential
information contribute to outcomes.
The starting point is to make the merit threshold τ individual specific. In
particular, for each nominee a personal threshold of voting support - the merit
threshold for that individual - is determined for this person’s election. The merit
threshold depends on accomplishment and is measured by an accomplishment
factor X ∈ [0, 1] . The factor X is the sum of two components X = Xa + Xb ,
where Xa reflects objective information and Xb embodies judgemental views of
the accomplishment. What follows is one possible formula for the determination
of X and the manner in which X determines τ . The resulting mechanism inevitably involves some arbitrary elements of construction and specific parameter
settings need to be employed to make the formula operational. In the following
section we provide some computations to illustrate the use of this formula and
detail its possible implementation. In practice, parameter settings which govern
the formula can be set by a society’s governing body and modified as may be
needed to take account of the evolution of a discipline over time and the views
of the society regarding qualifications for fellowship election.
The component Xa depends on quantitative information about research accomplishment and material contribution to the discipline. For example, the
governing body may designate certain core journals from which publication
data is collected. These might comprise major general interest journals and
leading field journals. Sole authored and co-authored publications might be distinguished and weighted in a ratio such as ρ : 1 for some relativity parameter ρ.
In this case, we may define Y = ρn1 + n2 as the core journal publication component where n1 is the number of sole authored publications and n2 the number
of co-authored publications. In what follows, we set ρ = 2 for simplicity and
extensions to the general case are straightforward. Publication numbers beyond
some limit (M ) may be ignored in order to delimit quantity eﬀects. Then, defining N = min (Y, M ),£ the¤ ‘objective’ data component Xa may be constructed
N
as Xa = 12 × M
∈ 0, 12 . In a similar manner, Xa can be modified to take
into account citations and other data-based measures of research performance
and impact. Since such extensions are fairly obvious and may be individually
weighted as components of Xa , they will not be explored here. The idea is
clear enough. Importantly, we confine the support of the objective component
Xa to a fixed subinterval Ua of [0, 1] , leaving a residual subset for subjective
6

£
¤
N
assessment. With the specific rule Xa = 12 × M
, the support Ua = 0, 12 and
Xa carries an implicit weight of 12 in the overall measure X. This weighting
system can be altered to reflect a societal view concerning the importance of
quantitative information relative to subjective assessment, as discussed further
below.
The component Xb measures the electorate’s collective peer evaluation of
a candidate’s qualifications for election. There are various ways in which Xb
may be determined. For the formula given here, we use the following approach.
Each member (j) of the voting electorate reports a subjective assessment factor
fj ∈ [0, 1] of the candidate (with higher values of f denoting higher subjective
assessment on the [0, 1] scale). These assessments
are averaged to produce a
P
subjective accomplishment factor f = #(S1all ) j∈Sall fj where Sall is the set of
all voters (e.g. existing fellows) in the electorate. Precise rules may be given
for determining fj in the case of abstentions, no returns or invalid returns. For
example, if ϕj ∈ [0, 1] is the subjective assessment of the candidate by elector
j, we may determine fj as follows:
©
ª
fj = ϕj × 1 j returns a subjective assessment factor ϕj ∈ (0, 1)
ª
©
(1)
+ ϕ × 1 j abstains, does not vote, or returns a ϕj 6∈ (0, 1)

where

ϕ=

1
# (Svalid )

X

ϕk ,

k∈Svalid

and Svalid is the set of electors who returned a valid assessment factor ϕ ∈
(0, 1) . According to this rule, abstentions, non voters and extreme assessments
ϕj 6∈ (0, 1) are eliminated and replaced by the average peer assessment (ϕ) over
all those electors returning a valid assessment. An alternative rule which assigns
greater weight to the electors who nominated the candidate for election would
determine ϕ as
ϕ=

1
# (Snom )

X

ϕk ,

(2)

k∈Snom

where Snom is the set of electors who nominated the candidate and returned
a valid assessment factor ϕ ∈ (0, 1) for this candidate. In both these rules,
extreme 0, 1 assessments are taken to be invalid. This device forces electors
to think more carefully about fractional assessments to mitigate the eﬀects of
extreme positions. Just as the upper limit M controls tail event eﬀects in Xa
by truncation (winsorizing the data), extreme assessments may be controlled in
Xb by adjusting the support of ϕ.
Having determined
each voter’s fj by this process, the aggregate component
P
f = #(S1all ) j∈Sall fj represents the average subjective view of the voting electorate on the candidate. The subjective contribution£ to ¤the accomplishment
factor X is then Xb = 12 × f, whose support is Ub = 0, 12 , and Xb carries an
7

implicit weight of 12 in X. Importantly, Xb places demands on individual electors that go beyond simple Yes/No or rank voting schemes. Each elector must
translate a subjective judgement of a candidate into a quantitative subjective
score ϕj for that candidate. If this score is to count then the elector must choose
a ϕj ∈ (0, 1) . Otherwise a community based score ϕ will be used instead4 . The
elector retains voting privileges to vote on the candidate. This vote and the
subjective assessment end up playing dual roles in the election. Thus, voters
influence the election of each candidate by transporting their personal information and subjective assessment of a candidate into a score that aﬀects the merit
threshold of the candidate and by a direct Yes/No or rank order vote on the
candidate.
Based on these two components the overall accomplishment factor is computed as X = Xa + Xb . Obvious modifications involve diﬀerential weights for
the objective and subjective elements Xa and Xb in the scheme, with corresponding diﬀerences in the supports Ua and Ub . For example, we might set
N
Xa = λ × M
∈ [0, λ] and Xb = (1 − λ) × f ∈ [0, 1 − λ] for some preassigned
weight λ ∈ [0, 1] . Then, when λ = 0 (respectively, 1) only subjective (objective)
assessments are taken into account.
In order to control the influence of the additional information embodied in X
on electorate voting, parameters may be set to determine upper (τ U ) and lower
(τ L ) merit thresholds for election. Thus, τ U defines the (upper level) proportion
of votes that is required for election when additional information X takes some
minimal value (γ ≥ 0). Similarly, τ L defines the (lower level) proportion of
votes that is required for election when additional information X takes some
maximal value (γ u ≤ 1).
With these settings and given the additional information X, the formula for
the merit threshold has the form

τ = τ U 1{X<γ

∙
½
¾¸
γu − X
+
τ
1
+
τ
+
(τ
−
τ
)
1{γ
L {X>γ u }
L
U
L
}
γu − γ

≤X≤γ u } ,

(3)

where 1A is the indicator of A. For each candidate (i) in the election the corresponding merit threshold τ i is computed using formula (3) together with the
component information Xi = Xai + Xbi for that individual. The decision rule
in the election of candidate i then depends on the actual voting percentage (Ai )
supporting that candidate in the election. If Ai ≥ τ i so that the percentage
of actual votes meets or exceeds the candidate’s merit threshold (τ i ) then the
4 Other possibilities might usefully be considered. For example, field diﬀerentials may mean
that some electors have diﬃculty appreciating (or even reading) a candidate’s work when it is
far from their own field of research. In such cases, an elector may not be comfortable returning
a personal peer review of the candidate, but may be ready to delegate the assessment to others,
such as (i) the nominating group, (ii) the fellows selection committee (if one exists), or (iii) all
other fellows. Assignation to these alternatives may be arranged by an elector being oﬀered
distinct discrete choices that signal these assigned assessments, such as (i) ϕj = 2, (ii) ϕj = 3,
and (iii) ϕj = 1 or 0, as in rule (1).
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candidate is elected. Symbolically, Ei = 1{Ai ≥τ i } gives the election outcome (1
= success; 0 = failure).
In practice, the main eﬀect of (3) is to require a higher percentage of votes
in the election for candidates with less demonstrated accomplishment, as represented by X. Peer support in the election votes must then be decisive to outweigh the eﬀect of less demonstrated accomplishment. When the merit threshold
bound parameters are equal, i.e. τ L = τ U = τ , the datum X has no eﬀect on the
outcome which is then determined solely by some specified threshold level for
election (τ ), as commonly occurs in current societal practice (e.g. in fellowship
elections of the Royal Society and the Econometric Society - see section 7.3 of
the Appendix).
To clarify the workings of the above formula, we may take a specific parametric form with τ U = 0.5, τ L = 0.2, γ = 0.25, and γ u = 0.75. The merit
threshold then has the following explicit form:
⎧
⎨

where:

©50% ¡
¢ª
20% + 30% 1 − 2 X − 14
τ=
⎩
20%

if X = Xa + Xb <
if 14 ≤ X ≤ 34
if X > 34

1
4

,

N
, where N = min (2n1 + n2 , 50) with n1 = number of sole au(i) Xa = 12 × 50
thored publications in core designated journals and n2 = number of co-authored
publications in core designated journals;
P
(ii) Xb = 12 × f and f = #(S1all ) j∈Sall fj ∈ [0, 1] with fj determined as in
(1).

In this example, candidates with an accomplishment factor X that is lower
than 14 must receive 50% or more votes in the election to be elected. Likewise,
candidates with an accomplishment factor that exceeds 34 need only receive
20% or more votes in the election to be elected. In this manner, quantitative
evidence on accomplishment and collective peer evaluation influence the election
outcome by adjustment of the election threshold, reducing requirements for
candidates who have and are perceived to have a strong track record in the
discipline. The parameter settings {τ U = 0.5, τ L = 0.2, γ = 0.25, γ u = 0.75}
are illustrative. Some computations that show the eﬀect of changes in these
parameters and those that determine the density of X and the implied density
of τ are reported in the following section.
One likely eﬀect of the introduction of evidence-based merit thresholds is
a reduction of the distortion bias that can arise from cluster voting for less
(materially) qualified candidates. For example, pre-eminent institutions often
have many existing society fellows and the electoral strength of these voters
can be decisive in securing election for colleagues who may be less materially
well qualified than others at less eminent institutions. The presence of such
candidates at pre-eminent institutions might itself be regarded as an endogenous
indicator of quality and may therefore, in some formulae, enter into the merit
9

threshold calculation - for example, in the case of the mechanism described
above, it may enter through the peer review factor Xb by way of the individual
quality assessment ϕj . However, we can expect that to be elected when an
evidence-based merit threshold is used, such candidates will generally require a
greater percentage of the votes cast in the election if their quantitative merit
score X is below the threshold γ .
Another mitigating eﬀect in the use of an evidence based merit threshold is
the reduction of bias arising from invisible college coalition voting for candidates
within certain fields. In such cases, electors may vote in coalition for some
candidates, making it easier for those candidates to reach a predetermined fixed
threshold of votes. Under (3) however, the peer view of the entire electorate is
taken into account in the measurement of Xb and the track record of material
accomplishment of the candidate comes into play in determining Xa . These
factors end up determining the merit threshold that is needed for a candidate’s
election and this broad basis of extra information on the candidate tends to
dilute the impact of coalition voting in the election.

4

The Merit Threshold Distribution

The implications of the above formulae can be explored by determining the
exact distribution of X and the implied distribution of τ . The latter is the
main focus and reveals how various degrees of component information aﬀect the
perception of merit and drive the threshold level.
To proceed, it is convenient to assume that the electorate population is
large enough for the key components to be continuously distributed, leading to
a distribution of X over the interval [0, 1] . The resulting distribution of τ has
a mixed continuous and discrete form comprising a double spike and a smooth
distribution. There are point masses at the upper and lower threshold levels
τ U and τ L , and a continuous distribution applies between these thresholds. In
particular, if pX (x) is the density of X on its support [0, 1] and pτ (t) is the
density of τ over (τ L , τ U ) , the upper and lower threshold probabilities are given
by
Z γ
Z 1
pU = P (τ ≥ τ U ) =
pX (x) dx, pL = P (τ ≤ τ L ) =
pX (x) dx, (4)
γu

0

and the density by
µ
¶
γu − γ
γu − γ
(τ U − t)
, for t ∈ (τ L , τ U ) .
pτ (t) = pX γ +
τU − τL
τU − τL

(5)

The distribution of X = Xa + Xb is a convolution of its two components.
The objective component
∙
¸
1
N
1 min (Y, M )
1
Xa = ×
= ×
∈ 0,
2 M
2
M
2
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has a probability mass at 12 arising from the upper bound M on admissable
publications data. As remarked above, this bound delimits quantity eﬀects in
bibliometric data to a preassigned level M . It follows that the density pa (x) of
Xa will in general have a spike at the upper bound 12 . The subjective component
Xb has density pb (x) = 2pf (2x) where pf is the density of f ∈ [0, 1] . If Xa and
Xb are independent, then the distribution of X has the convolution form
pX (x) =

Z

0

x∧1/2

pa (x − t) pb (t) dt.

With this structure it is possible to obtain the density pX (x) in terms of the
density5 pY (y) of Y and the density pb (x) of Xb . Derivations are given in section
7.1 of the Appendix, where it is shown that

pX (x) = 2M

Z

0

x∧1/2

µ
¶
1
pY (2M (x − t)) pb (t) dt + μM × pb x −
× 1{x≥ 1 } .
2
2
(6)

Fig. 1: Densities of X = Xa + Xb for distributions of Xa and Xb corresponding
to high accomplishment (HA) and high peer review (HR), mixed peer review
(MR), and low peer review (LR).
The density pX (x) can have a (discrete) jump at x = 12 . The size of the jump
depends on the parameter μM = P (Xa > M ) corresponding to the probability
5 In working out the exact distribution theory, it is convenient to let the aggregate publication component Y = 2n1 + n2 have a continuous density. A corresponding discrete equivalent
can be computed by integration over cells of unit length covering the integers.
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that an individual’s publication count exceeds the designated count M. The size
of the jump also depends on the value of the density pb (y) of Xb at y = 0 and
is zero when pb (0) = 0 so that pX (x) is continuous in that case. Thus, the
population of candidates with a publication count in excess of the designated
maximum produces a point mass in the distribution of Xa giving a spike and
smooth density pa (x) of Xa and, upon convolution, the spike can translate into
a jump in the density of X at x = 12 , the upper point of the domain of Xa , when
pb (0) > 0.
Fig. 1 illustrates these possibilities for various accomplishment and peer
review distributions that are fully described later in the paper (Section 7). Discontinuities in the density pX (x) of X typically arise when there is conflict
between objective evidence as it is embodied in the distribution of Xa with a
point mass at level M , and peer review opinion when this produces a positive
density to Xb at zero. In Fig. 1, the two discontinuous densities shown in the
broken lines of the figures arise when high material accomplishment (manifest in
the Xa distribution with P (Xa ≥ M ) > 0) couples with subjective peer review
that includes some strong negative opinion (associated with a density pb (x)
of Xb for which pb (0) > 0, reflecting a cluster of peer opinion around zero).
The probability mass in Xa leads to a jump in the density at X = 12 and the
negative peer review eﬀect leads to a decline in the subsequent density of X
as X approaches its upper limit of unity. The stronger the negative peer review, the sharper the ultimate decline in the density, as manifest in the high
accomplishment with low peer review (HA & LR) case in the figure.

5

Implementation

Formula (3) seeks to bring both quantitative and qualitative information to bear
on fellowship elections. The intent is to ensure that substantive research accomplishments and collective peer review count in electing new fellows, so that the
threshold of support from existing fellows is greater (at most τ U × 100%) for
individuals with fewer accomplishments and is less (at least τ L ×100%) for those
with greater accomplishments. While the publication count component Xa is
primarily quantitative, this measure also has an implicit qualitative element by
virtue of the journal selection and the peer judgements that underlie publication. The journal selection can obviously be modified by a society’s governing
council to reflect changing standards and evolution of the discipline as it manifests in core journals. The component Xb allows for the full voting electorate to
return subjective assessments of the candidate. These assessments oﬀer the opportunity to take account of a wider set of qualifications (such as acknowledged
impact of research on other disciplines, outstanding pedagogical work, mentorship, and contributions to software development) so as to more fully reflect the
professional contributions of an individual candidate for election. The measure
Xb then reflects the overall peer assessment of the candidate across the voting
electorate.
Implementation of this procedure requires parameter inputs, data collection
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and some computation. The process can be coordinated by a society’s governing
body and is readily accomplished online using a web server. The key steps are
detailed below.
1. Prior Parameter Settings. Parameters that appear in formula (3) need
to be set by the society, presumably through its governing body or council.
The parameters that require prior setting are as follows.
(a) The domain parameters τ L , τ U , γ , and γ u that appear directly in
formula (3).
(b) The bound parameter M that specifies the upper bound on the number of publications (or other bibliometric information) considered in
the quantity measure Xa .
(c) The relativity parameter ρ (currently 2 in (3)) that distinguishes
sole authored from co-authored publications in the publication count
Y = 2n1 + n2 .
(d) The weight parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] (currently λ = 12 in (3)) which
allocates a weight of λ to quantitative information Xa and a weight
of 1 − λ to subjective assessment Xb .
2. Nominations. Candidates for fellowship need to be nominated by those
members enfranchised to vote in fellowship elections. The information
required in a nomination typically would include the following.
(a) A nominating statement of some designated length (such as 200
words).
(b) A list of n∗ of the candidate’s most influential publications (typically,
n∗ ≤ 5).
(c) Citation data on those n∗ publications.

(d) Summary quantitative information on publications including the pair
(n1 , n2 ) of sole authored and co-authored publications.
(e) A subjective assessment factor ϕ ∈ (0, 1) of the candidate by the
nominator.
3. Deadline for the submission of all nominations, including the objective
and subjective information that must accompany the nomination.
4. A criterion to determine those nominations that will be taken to the electorate for voting. For example: all nominated candidates might be submitted to the electorate or only those candidates who have received at
least a certain number n# of separate nominations (typically n# ≥ 3).
5. Deadline for the online distribution to the voters of information about
all nominated candidates for election. This information will include the
nomination information 2a, 2b, 2c listed above, together with the objective
13

nom
component Xa and
= 12 × f nom , where
P the subjective component Xb
1
nom
f
= #(Snom ) k∈Snom ϕk is the average subjective assessment factor
of the candidate from the nominating electors, which is calculated from
the assessments ϕk submitted by the nominating electors.

6. Deadline for the election votes and assessments to be submitted. These
votes include both the vote itself (Yes/No) and the subjective assessment
factor made by each elector for each nominated candidate.
7. After the election, votes for each candidate are counted. The subjective
assessment data submitted in the election returns by each voter is aggregated to produce the subjective component Xb and combined with the
objective data Xa to produce X and compute the merit threshold τ for
each nominated candidate. Actual votes for candidate i are expressed as a
percentage (Ai ) of all valid votes cast and compared with the candidate’s
merit threshold τ i . Candidate i is elected if Ai ≥ τ i .
Some computations that are given later in this paper oﬀer general guidance
on the impact of diﬀerent parameter settings. More explicit evaluation that is
relevant to a particular society can be conducted through simulations that mirror ingredients within the formula (such as particular parameter settings) that
produce outcomes like those of earlier societal elections (conducted without the
formula) and alternative outcomes that result from other parameter settings
(as counterfactual tests to evaluate the sensitivity of outcomes to parameter
changes). These simulations and guidelines can be assessed by the governing
body to determine the adequacy of certain parameter ranges for society purposes.
Importantly, even without formulae such as (3), elections require some parameter settings. For instance, in an election system where only votes count,
the merit threshold τ for election must still be determined. Such a system has
τ = τ L = τ U and then any information in X is ignored.
The quantitative information (n1 , n2 ) that is submitted in the nomination
can be cross-checked through an online service that provides automated harvesting of publication data. To ensure uniform treatment across candidates, a
society may require that all publication data be obtained (and checked) in this
way from a reputable bibliometric harvester.

6

Conclusion

The focus of the present contribution is the appraisal of credentials, the operational use of available quantitative information and the pooling of human
judgement across a population of voters in the process of electing new members
to a meritocracy. Some of the problems addressed here might also be studied
in a dynamic voting environment. A learned society is a social institution in
which the size of its fellowship (itself an electorate) is endogenous since it is
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determined by voting decisions taken by this same electorate over time. Such
dynamic voting problems have been studied in the economic theory and behavioral literature, where new complexities have been discovered. In exploring club
voting decisions, for instance, Roberts (1999) has shown that dynamic voting on
club size leads to time inconsistent outcomes and intrinsic steady states in the
system that are determined by the voting dynamics. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000) have developed a dynamic model of the voting franchise that seeks to
explain gradual processes of reform and democratization such as the emergence
of western democracy. More general problems of endogenous social choice and
policy determination have been studied recently in Luganoﬀ (2009). This research in economic theory is relevant in the current setting of meritocracy voting
because it focuses on the evolution of the voting franchise over time and the effects of this endogeneity on institutional structure and reform. On the other
hand, none of this work addresses the issue of appraisal that is fundamental to
meritocracy.
The goal of ‘measuring merit’ is undoubtedly elusive. But as the header
to this article entreats, the diﬃculty of the challenge should not prevent the
attempt. Within economics and more broadly among the social sciences, theory
and measurement are seen as twin sisters that work in unison to advance our
understanding of human behavior and society. It surely befits such disciplines
and particularly economics, so often dubbed the queen of the social sciences, to
pioneer a way of bringing the ‘theory quantitative’ and ‘empirical quantitative’
into societal decision making on matters as fundamental to a meritocracy as
fellowship elections.
The formulae given here are nothing more than a first step in addressing this
issue. The specific rule (3) is designed to assist in the merit selection process by
explicitly taking into account subjective assessments of individual candidates
for election as well as direct quantitative measures of quality such as publication numbers in learned journals, rankings or citations. As we have argued,
quantitative assessment rules may help decision makers widen the eﬀective electorate of opinion, thereby enhancing the information set that is available for
consideration in evaluating candidates. Information on publications ends up
reflecting assessments and recommendations that are sought in the peer review
process. Citations provide information about received opinion on research (or
its neglect). In both cases, a wider body of views and material evidence comes
into consideration when the information is embodied in a merit threshold for
election.
In this process, the demands on voters and decision makers are greater than
in simple Yes/No or rank order voting. As we have discussed, voters end up influencing the election of each candidate in two separate ways. They report their
subjective assessment of a candidate into a numerical score that combines with
the judgements of other voters and material information about the candidate
to determine the candidate’s merit threshold. They also record an individual
vote on the candidate which combines with other votes to determine the actual voting percentage in favor of the candidate’s election. Both the subjective
assessment and the vote influence the final outcome.
15

The formulation given here is a tentative beginning. Obviously a great deal
more work can go into its further mathematical development, into the use of
voting theory in its formulation, and into its online implementation. More attention to data sources and the quantification of subjective assessment both seem
desirable. Empirical work may also be possible using past fellowship election
data to determine parameters implicit in existing rules and to perform counterfactuals. The present paper will have achieved its limited goal if it serves to
stimulate further thinking on these issues and on the general problem of quantifying the assessment of merit. Research on this topic seems important not
only for learned society decision making but for the many other instances in
academic life where merit assessment is such a critical matter in the careers and
lives of our colleagues.

7
7.1

Appendix
The merit threshold distribution

To find the distribution of τ , we need the distribution of X, which in turn
depends£ on ¤the distribution of its components
£ 1 ¤Xa and Xb . The support of Xa =
1 N
1
1
is
0,
=
f
is
0, 2 , and the support of X is [0, 1] .
,
the
support
of
X
b
2M
2
2
We assume that Xa and Xb are independent with respective densities pa (x) and
pb (x) = 2pf (2x) where pf is the density of f ∈ [0, 1] . The density of X is then
given by the convolution
Z x∧1/2
p (x) =
pa (x − t) pb (t) dt
(7)
0

The density pa (x) of Xa is complicated by a point mass at x = 12 arising
from the upper bound of N = min (Y, M ) where Y = 2n1 + n2 . It is convenient
to let (n1 , n2 ) have a continuous joint density p12 (a, b) over [0, ∞)×[0, ∞). This
distribution can readily be transformed into a discrete distribution by rounding
up or down non integer values of (n1 , n2 ) and obtaining the corresponding discrete probability distribution over N × N by integration over rectangles covering
the integers. It is easier to work with the continuous version, and under these
assumptions the density of Y is
Z
1 ∞
pY (y) =
p12 (0.5 (y − b) , b) db.
2 0

Since N = min (Y, M ) = Y 1{Y <M } + M 1{Y ≥M} , the distribution of N is mixed
continuous-discrete with a rectified (spike and smooth) density
pN (y) = pY (y) × 1{0≤Y <M } + μM × δ (y − M ) ,
(8)
R∞
where μM = P {Y ≥ M } = M pY (y) dy and δ (x) is the Dirac delta function.
The cdf of N is
Z y∧M
PN (y) =
pY (s) ds + μM × U (y − M ) ,
0
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where U (x) is the step function U (x) = 1{x≥0} . The implied (rectified) density
N
is pa (x) = 2M pN (2M x) , which has the explicit form
of Xa = 12 M
µ
µ
¶¶
1
pa (x) = 2M pY (2M x) × 1{0≤x< 1 } + μM × δ 2M x −
,
(9)
2
2
with a point mass of μM at x = 1/2.
Combining (7) and (9), the density pX (x) over x ∈ [0, 1] is given by
Z

x∧1/2

0

Z

= 2M

pa (x − t) pb (t) dt
x∧1/2

pY (2M (x − t)) 1{0≤x−t< 1 } pb (t) dt
2
µ
¶¶
x µ
1
+μM ×
δ 2M x − t −
pb (t) dt
2
0
µ
¶
Z x∧1/2
1
,
pY (2M (x − t)) pb (t) dt + μM × pb x −
× 1{x≥ 1 }(10)
= 2M
2
2
0
0

Z

yielding (6). Observe that pY (2M (x − t)) = 0 for x − t < 0 and pb (t) = 0 for
t > 1/2, so that
Z

1

pX (x) dx = 2M

0

= 2M

Z

1/2

0

+2M

Z

Z

1/2

=

Z

1/2

0

=

Z

0

7.2

Z

0

x

0

1

Z

Z

1

Z

0

x∧1/2

pY (2M (x − t)) pb (t) dtdx + μM

pY (2M (x − t)) pb (t) dtdx
1/2

0

pY (2M (x − t)) pb (t) dtdx + μM

2M ( 12 −t)

pY (s) dspb (t) dt +

Z

1/2

0

0

1/2

Z

M

pY (s) pb (t) dtdx + μM =

0

Z

0

Z

Z

Z

1

pb
0.5

µ

1
x−
2

0.5

pb (s) ds

0

M
2M ( 12 −t)

pY (s) dspb (t) dt + μM

M

pY (s) dx + μM = 1 − μM + μM = 1.

Exact theory

An exact theory suitable for computation can be obtained under explicit distributional assumptions concerning the primitive components (n1 , n2 , f ) that
determine the objective and subjective elements in X. We work with continuous distributions and simple parameterizations so that it is convenient to explore
how diﬀerent distributional shapes in the primitives impact the merit threshold
distribution.
P
Let n1 ∼ Γ (κ1 , θ1 ) , n2 ∼ Γ (κ2 , θ2 ) , and f = #(S1all ) j∈Sall fj ∼ B (α, β) .
Here Γ (κ, θ) denotes the gamma distribution with scale parameter θ > 0,
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¶

dx

1
κ−1 −x/θ
shape parameter κ > 0, and density p (x) = Γ(κ)θ
e
for x ≥ 0,
κx
1/2
with mean E (n) = κθ and standard deviation S (n) = κ θ; and B (α, β)
denotes the beta distribution with parameters α, β ≥ 0 and density p (x) =
1
α−1
(1 − x)β−1 for x ∈ [0, 1] , with mean E (f ) = α/ (α + β) and stanB(α,β) x
n
o1/2
dard deviation S (f ) = (αβ)1/2 / (α + β)2 (α + β + 1)
.
The distribution of Y = 2n1 + n2 is the sum Γ (κ1 , 2θ1 ) + Γ (κ2 , θ2 ) . Upon
convolution of these two gamma distributions and after some calculation, we
obtain the following density of Y
µ
¶j
∞
xκ−1 e−x/2θ1 X (κ2 )j
1
1
pY (x) =
−
xj
Γ (κ) (2θ1 )κ1 θκ2 2 j=0 j! (κ)j 2θ1 θ2
½
µ
¾¶
e−x/2θ1 xκ−1
1
1
=
−
,
(11)
κ1 κ2 1 F1 κ2 , κ; x
2θ1 θ2
Γ (κ) (2θ1 ) θ2

where 1 F1 is a confluent hypergeometric function, with κ = κ1 + κ2 , and where
we take θ2 > 2θ1 (a similar formula holds when θ2 < 2θ1 ). When θ2 = 2θ1 = θ
the density is simply a gamma distribution with composite parameters (κ, θ) .
N
The distribution of X = Xa + Xb = 12 M
+ 12 f, where N = min (Y, M ) ,
can now be obtained by quadrature using (6) upon specification of the parameters. The parameters can be classified as follows: (i) density parameters
κ1 , θ1 , κ2 , θ2 ,α, β that govern accomplishment and peer assessment; and (ii) control parameters M, γ , γ u that implement policy concerning winsorizing bibliometric data via the upper bound M and the upper γ u and lower γ limits to
the overall assessment factor X which determine the merit thresholds.

7.3

Illustration

The distribution (11) can be used for computation given explicit parameter values for the determining densities and the control parameters. We illustrate with
the following classifications shown in Table 1 of the parameters corresponding
to a selection of accomplishment and peer review levels.
Table 1: Parameter Classifications
Peer Review
(α, β)
E (f ) S (f )

High
α = 5, β = 1
0.83 0.14

Mixed
α = 1, β = 1
0.5
0.28

Low
α = 1, β = 5
0.16 0.14

Accomplishment
(κ1 , κ2 , θ1 , θ2 )
E (n1 ) E (n2 )
S (n1 )
S (n2 )

High
(2, 8, 2, 4)
8
32
2.83 11.31

Mixed
(2, 2, 2, 3)
4
6
2.82 4.24

Low
(1, 2, 0.5, 2)
0.5
4
0.5
2.82

Controls

¡
¢
(M, γ 1 , γ 2 ) = 50, 14 , 34
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The high and low peer review parameters give mirror image densities for
the peer review variate Xb on [0, 0.5] and the mixed peer review parameters
correspond to a uniform density, as shown in Fig. 2. The distribution of the
bibliometric variate Y = 2n1 + n2 is calculated using (11) and the densities are
shown in Fig. 3 for high, mixed and low levels of accomplishment. The overall
variate X = Xa + Xb has density pX (x) which is computed using (10). The
densities are shown in Fig. 1 (given earlier in the paper) for high accomplishment (HA) combined with high peer review (HR), mixed peer review (MR), and
low peer review (LR). Figs. 4-5 show the corresponding densities for a mixed
level of accomplishment (MA) and low accomplishment (LA). The merit threshold distribution of τ is computed using the rectified (double spike and smooth)
density pτ (t) given in (4) and (5). Table 2 presents summary statistics calculated for this merit threshold distribution, showing the probability P (τ ≥ τ U )
of exceeding the upper threshold τ U , the probability P (τ ≤ τ L ) of exceeding
the lower threshold τ L , and the mean threshold level E (τ ) .
Table 2: Merit Threshold Statistics
Peer Review
Accomplishment
P (τ ≥ τ U )
P (τ ≤ τ L )
E (τ )

High
0.000
0.762
0.236

High
Mixed
0.003
0.028
0.316

Low
0.013
0.000
0.369

High
0.008
0.371
0.323

Mixed
Mixed
0.227
0.008
0.406

Low
0.337
0.000
0.445

High
0.031
0.050
0.421

Low
Mixed
0.651
0.000
0.482

High accomplishment and high peer review produce a density for overall
accomplishment X that is concentrated in the upper part of the interval [0,1],
which leads to a high probability P (τ ≤ τ L ) = 0.762 of reaching the lower
threshold τ L and makes fellowship election easier. The mean threshold level in
this case is E (τ ) = 0.236, close to the lower bound control parameter τ L = 0.2.
Fig. 1 shows discontinuities in the density pX (x) in two cases (HA & MR; HA &
LR) which arise from a nonnegligible probability P (Xa ≥ M ) of Xa exceeding
the control parameter bound M which delimits quantity¡eﬀects¢ in bibliometric
data to that level. In each of these cases the density pb x − 12 > 0 at x = 12 ,
thereby producing
¡
¢ the discontinuity in pX (x) . In the high peer review case (HA
& HR), pb x − 12 = 0 at x = 12 and the density pX (x) is continuous.
In a similar way, low accomplishment and low peer review produce a density
for X that is concentrated in the lower part of the interval [0, 1] , giving a high
probability P (τ ≥ τ U ) = 0.912 of exceeding the upper threshold τ U and a zero
probability of reaching the lower threshold τ L , making fellowship election harder
because of the high voting threshold required for election. In this case, the mean
threshold level is E (τ ) = 0.496, which is very close to the upper bound control
parameter τ U = 0.5. Table 2 provides a selection of other cases, showing how
mixtures of high and low levels of accomplishment and peer reviews aﬀect the
merit threshold.
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Low
0.912
0.000
0.496

p(x)

10

7.5

5

2.5

0
0

0.125

0.25

0.375

0.5

2(2x)α−1 (1−2x)β−1
B(α,β)

Fig. 2: Peer review (Xb ) density pb (x) =
for high peer
review {α = 1, β = 5} (solid/green), mixed peer review {α = 1, β = 1}
(dotted/black), and low peer review {α = 5, β = 1} (dashed/blue).

Fig. 3: Densities of the bibliometric component Y = 2n1 + n2 for parameter
values corresponding to high (HA), mixed (MA) and low (LA) levels of
accomplishment given in Table 1.
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Fig. 4: Densities of X = Xa + Xb for mixed accomplishment (MA) and high
(HR), mixed (MR), and low (LR) peer review.

Fig. 5: Densities of X = Xa + Xb for low accomplishment (LA) and high
(HR), mixed (MR), and low (LR) peer review.
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7.4

Fellowship Elections in Economics, Statistics and National Academies

This Appendix provides some background information on fellowship election
or appointment procedures as they are currently performed in various leading
societies in economics, statistics and the natural sciences.
Econometric Society: Annual fellowship elections are held and the electorate
comprises existing fellows of the society. (Prior to 1960 fellows were nominated
and elected by the council). Names of candidates nominated for election are
placed on a ballot and fellows return a Yes/No vote. To secure election, candidates must obtain 30% or more votes in the election. Nominations are by
petition of at least three members of the society (who are usually, but not
necessarily, fellows) or by a nominating committee appointed by the president.
Nominations include a statement of the candidate’s contributions, a list of up
to six major publications, reference to the candidate’s home webpage, and a list
of those nominating the candidate and an indication whether the nominating
committee endorses the candidate. “To be eligible for nomination as a Fellow, a
person must have published original contributions to economic theory or to such
statistical, mathematical, or accounting analyses as have a definite bearing on
problems in economic theory, and must be, or upon election become, a member
of the Society.”6
American Economic Association: Distinguished fellowships are by special
appointment. “Past Presidents of the Association shall be Distinguished Fellows. Additional Distinguished Fellows may be elected, but not more than three
in any one calendar year from economists of high distinction in the United States
and Canada.”7
European Economic Association: Fellows are elected by virtue of the oﬃce
held in the Association. Fellowships are “bestowed on the Association’s oﬃcers,
the editors of the Association’s journal, the Programme Chairs of its annual
Congresses, as well as the Marshall and Schumpeter lecturers. Becoming a
Fellow is contingent on becoming a member of the association.”8
Institute of Mathematical Statistics: Election is by a special fellows selection committee which reviews nominations. Qualification for fellowship requires
“demonstrated distinction in research in statistics or probability by publication
of independent work of merit” or “well-established leadership whose contributions to the field of statistics or probability ... or the application of statistics or
probability ... shall be judged of equal value”9 .
Royal Statistical Society: No merit assessment is required. “Fellowship is
open to all who have an interest in statistics: formal qualifications are not
needed.”10
American Statistical Association: Election is by a fellows selection commit6 Econometric

Society website: http://www.econometricsociety.org/society.asp
Economic Association website: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/disting_fellows.htm
8 European Economic Association Website: http://www.eeassoc.org/index.php?page=21
9 IMS Oﬃcial Website: http://www.imstat.org/awards/fellows.htm
1 0 Royal Statistical Society website: http://membership.rss.org.uk/main.asp?page=1280
7 American
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tee which reviews nominations that require online submission of detailed forms
about the candidate, letters of support (at most four), draft citations and other
information. “Each committee member assigns a rating from 1 to 5 to a given
nominee, with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest; non-integer ratings
are perfectly acceptable. Though there are no fixed criteria for rating a nomination, the following table provides some examples of how a rater might typically
react to a nomination package.”11 This table12 indicates the potential impact of
various criteria on a committee member’s subjective assessment of a nominated
candidate. For example, “sole authorship of 5 or more articles in leading statistical journals”, “strong evidence of positive impact of mentoring", and “Program
committee chair for a major ASA meeting”13 are all rated as “++” in terms of
impact.
The Royal Society: There is an upper limit of 44 new Fellows, 8 Foreign
Members and 1 Honorary Fellow. Candidates for the Fellowship or Foreign
Membership must be nominated by two Fellows of the Royal Society, who sign
a certificate of proposal. “The Council of the Royal Society oversees the selection process. Two Oﬃcers, the Biological Sciences Secretary and the Physical
Sciences Secretary, are responsible for the smooth running of this process. The
Council appoints ten subject area committees, known as Sectional Committees,
to advise it about the selection of the list of the strongest candidates. Each
candidate is considered by the relevant Sectional Committee on the basis of a
full curriculum vitae, details of their research achievements, a list of all their
scientific publications and a copy of their 20 best scientific papers. Members
of the Sectional Committees vote to produce a short-list. The final list of candidates is confirmed by the Council and a secret ballot of Fellows is held. A
candidate is elected if he or she secures two-thirds of votes.”14
The British Academy: Fellowship is by election and Academy Council decision. “Candidates are proposed by Section Standing Committees, Fellows or by
Vice Chancellors and Principals of UK Universities. Section Committees meet
to agree the names to be put to a secret ballot within each Section. Sections
agree the names of assessors. The case for election and the particular distinction
of each candidate is sent to assessors. The reports of assessors supply an independent judgement to supplement and inform the deliberations of the Section.
A secret ballot is then conducted within each Section. Sections meet to study
the ballot results and to make recommendations to the humanities and social
science Groups, which are responsible for ensuring consistency across Sections.
The Groups’ and the Fellowship and Structures Committee’s recommendations
are considered and discussed by the Academy’s Council, which agrees a list of
names to be nominated for election to the Annual General Meeting of Fellows.”15
The National Academy of Sciences: Membership is by election. “Only Academy members may submit formal nominations. Consideration of a candidate
1 1 American

Statistical Association website: http://www.amstat.org/
http://www.amstat.org/fellows/nominations/pdfs/RatingofNominees.pdf
1 3 American Statistical Association website: http://www.amstat.org/careers/fellows.cfm
1 4 The Royal Society website: http://royalsociety.org/about-us/fellowship/election/
1 5 British Academy website: http://www.britac.ac.uk/fellowship/elections/elecproc.cfm
1 2 See
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begins with his or her nomination, followed by an extensive and careful vetting process that results in a final ballot at the Academy’s annual meeting.
Currently, a maximum of 84 members may be elected annually.”16
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